~4?
>':"

~i_;:...J

US EXECUTIVE BRANCH PATENT POLICY,
GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC
Arti K. Rai*

I ntrod ucti on
Over the last few decades, the US executive branch has been a central
player in numerous struggles over the content of global pacem law.
Although the venue for these struggles has frequently shifted, the
executive branch has consistently favored strong patent rights. In this
chapter, I discuss how US global positioning compares co positions
taken by executive branch agencies that focus on domestic policy.
I also discuss how rhe rise of China may affect not only US global
and domestic patent policy bur also larger questions of "innovation
policy."

I. A Brief History of US Efforts
Starting in the 1980s, the US and like-minded countries engineered a
transfer of patent law discussions from the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) co a venue, the World Trade Organization
(WTO), chat they viewed as more friendly to strong patent rights.
At che WTO, these countries succeeded in promulgating a suite of
minimum intellectual property standards in rhe 1994 Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement).'

' Elvin R. Larry Professor, Duke Law School. From 2009 to 2010, 1 served as the
Administrator for Policy and Exrernal Affairs at the US Pacem and Trademark
Office (USPT0).1his concriburion relies only on publicly available informacion,
however. I thank Larry Helfer and Ruth Okediji for helpful comments. Richard
Lee provided exceptional research assistance.
1. See SuSAN K. SELL, PRIVAT E POWER. Pvauc LAw: TH E GLOBAl.IZ.ATION
Of INTELLECT UAL PROP ERTY RIGHTS (2003);Jc:romc H . R<::ichman. Universal
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Subsequently, when Geneva-based institutions not only proved resistant tO further increases in global patent protection,2 but actually emerged as
fora for pushing back on the TRIPS Agreemenc, 3 the United Stares shifted its
efforts ro bilateral and plurilaceral agreements. The United States currently has
"TRIPS-plus" intellectual property provisions in bilateral treaties negotiated
with numerous developing countries, including Bahrain, Cambodia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Jordan, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Viernam.4
On rhe plurilareral parent from , the United States has also been active,
if less immediately successfuL Although some scholars had argued that the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) could inhibit access to generic
drugs by encouraging parries to adopt border measures tO interdict drugs suspeered of patent or trademark infringement,5 the treaty's border measures ultimately excluded patents.6 Activicy now centers on the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP), a p lurilareral agreement being negotiated among the United
States, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Brunei, Singapore, Peru, Vietnam,
Malaysia, and (most recently) Japan.
The patent provisions of these bilateral and plurilateral agreements focus on
pharmaceuticals? The provisions of the draft TPP agreement appear representative. Although an official draft of the TPP has not been made public,leaked drafts
include a host of requirements related ro pharmaceuricals.8 Perhaps the most significant is a requirement that signatOries allow so-called "secondary" patents. These are
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TIUPS Component of the
WTOAgm:ment, 29 INT'L LAWYER34S (1995).
2. Rochelle Dreyfuss & Jerome H. Reichman, Harmonization without Consensus: Critical
Reflection on Drafting a Subj'tantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 86 (2007).
3. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and the NeUJ Dynamics
International Intellectual Property Making, 29 YALE J. Iln'L L. 1 (2004).
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4. Susan K. Sell, TRIPS J.tas Never Enough: Vertical Forum Sb{(ting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP,
18]. lNTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011).
5. Cynthia Ho, Glob,d Access to Medicine: The Influence of Competing Patent Perspectives, 34
FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. I (2011); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating
Ban·im to International Trade? ACTA BoTder Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT'L
L. Rev. 645 (2011).
6. In any event, rhe decision by rhe European Parliament ro reject ACTA renders rhcsc concerns less pressing. See Press Release, European Parl iament, European Parliament Rejects
ACTA (Jul}' 4, 2012), available at Imp:/ /www.curopad.europa.eu/ news/ en/pressroom/
comenr/20120703IPR48247/lmn1/Eu ropean-Parliamcnr-rejects-ACTA.
7. See, e.g., Dominican Republic- Central America-United Scares Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR), arcs. 15.9-1 S.lO, Aug. S, 2004; United Scares-Oman Free Trade Agreement,
ans. 15.8-l 5.9, Jan. 19, 2006.
8. See Trans-Pacific Parrnership (TPP), Inrellecrual Property Chaprcr, Drafi:- Feb. 10, 201 l,
ttvailable at hrrp:/ /keionline.orglsires/defaulr/files/rpp-10feb20 11-us-rexr-ipr-chaprcr.pdf
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patents that cover not the drug's primary active chemical compound bur, instead,
modified forms of the compound (e.g., salts, isomers), new uses of the compow1d,
or new methods of using the compound.9 According to one leaked draft, the TPP's
secondary patent provision states that patents on new forms, uses, and methods
"may satisfy the criteria for patentability, even ifsuch invention does not result in the
enhancement of the known efficacy of that product." 10 This provision appears tO be
a direct response to Article 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act, which prohibits granting
patents on "the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance...."11
Other significant TPP provisions include a mandate of data exclusivity to the
originator fum d1at supplies the clinical data for the national regulatory authority's
approval of a drug. The draft agreement calls for five years of exclusivity from the
date of marketing approval of a new "pharmaceutical product" 12 and three years
from the date of marketing approval based on new "clinical information."13 The
TPP draft also calls for legal linkage between patents and approval by a regulatory
authority of generic marketing. Specifically, prior to securing approval, the generic
firm must show mat patents relevant to the drug have expired, are invalid, or are
not infringed. 14 This legal linkage has the potential to delay generic marketing, as
does a TPP provision calling for patent term extension based on regularory delays. 15
Finally, TPP signatories are supposed to agree to limits on pre-grant opposition proceedings and ro border measure provisions to interdict goods suspected of patent
infringement, including in-transit goods. 16

[hereinafter TPPl]; Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Imellecrual Property Chapter (Selected
Provisions), Draft-Sept. 20 11, available at hcrp://www.cirizenstradc.org/ctc/wp-contcnc/
uploads/20 11/10/TransPacificiP 1.pdf[hercinati:er TPP2].
9. Seegenerally Michael Burdon & Kristic: Sloper, The Art ofU.ring Secondary Patents to Impror'e
Protection, 3 L'IT'L ]. MED. MARKETING 226 (2003); European Commission, Pharmaccucical
Secror Inquiry: Final Report 184-92 (2009), cwailable at hrrp://ec.europa.eu/comperirion/
sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiryI sraff_working_papcr_parr 1.pdf.
10. TPP 1,supra note 8,arr. 8.
11. The Parents (Amendment) Acr, No. 15 of200S, § 3(d) (Universal200S).
12. TPP2, supra nore 8, arr. 9.2(a).

13. !d. arc. 9.2(c).
14. !d. arc. 9.5.

1S. !d. arc. 8.6(b).
16. TPP1, supra note 8, arts. 8.7, 14.4; see aL<o Medccins Sans Fromieres. Trading Awcry
Health: How the U.S.'s bttellectual Property Demand.for the Trmu-Pacijic Partnc1:<IJip Agreement
Threaten Acce.rs to lvledicines, Aug. 2012. availablt: tU hcrp://aids2012.msf.orglwp-comenc/
uploads/20 12/07/TPP-Issue-Brief-IAC-July20 12.pdf.
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II. Comparing International and Domestic Positions
To a significant extent, the pharmaceutical patent positions being advocated by the
United States internationally overlap with current US law. As discussed further
below, US law allows at least certain types ofsecondary patents. United States' law
also confers five- and three-year data exclusivity terms for originator applications,
establishes a linkage between parenting and approval of generics by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), contains patent term extensions for delays in both
patent processing at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and regulatory approval delays at the FDA, and prohibits pre-gram opposition.
The extent co which the US-style approach to pharmaceutical patents is
appropriate for poorer countries is the subject of tremendous dispute. Presumably,
however, US executive branch advocacy for parent righ:s abroad stronger than
those for which it advocates domestically would be even more controversial.
Thus it is worth examining whether the US international posture is in fact more
"pro-patent" than its domestic posture.
One candidate for such inconsistency is the US non-obviousness requirement. As compared with its application in others areas of technology, judicial
application of the non-obviousness requirement in pharmaceuticals has been
relatively robuscP Notably, the executive branch has consistently supported
a strong non-obviousness requirement. In fact, in 2007, the executive branch
was influential in persuading rhe US Supreme Court co issue an opinion, KSR
v. Teiejlex, 18 making it dear co lower courts chat non-obviousness was an important gatekeeper requirement for all patent applications. 19
The executive branch's domestic support for non-obviousness as a muscular
requirement is arguably in tension with its international position chat secondary
pacencs on new formulations "may satisfy the criteria for patentability, even if
such invention does nor result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that
producr." 20 Although US non-obviousness law does not deny secondary formulation patents, it typically subjects them co a requirement that the formulation have
unexpected propenies.21 Moreover, during the Obama administration, the executive branch brought a Supreme Court case arguing that US antitrust law, US
patent law, and the US "Hacch-Waxman" regime for patent linkage and generic

17. Arri Rai, Building a Better Innovation Symm: Combining Facially NmtraiPatent Standards
with Regulation ~(End Product Therapewics, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1037 (2008).

18. sso

u.s. 398 (2007}.

19. Arri Rai, Wbo's Afaid oftbe Federal Circuit.?, 121
20. TPP1,mpra nore 8, an. 8.
21. Rai,>7tpm nore 17.
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L.J. ONL. 135 (2011}.
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entry are all intended tO encourage validity challenges by generics to secondary
pharmaceutical parents that might be non-obvious or otherwise invalid.22 Over
rhe strong objections of che branded pharmaceutical industry, the Obama administration also successfully argued in favor of allowing generic entry in cases where
che generic states it will not market irs produce for uses indicated in secondary
method-of-use patents.23
Ultimately, in part because of executive branch advocacy of robust generic
entry through Hatch-Waxman, che actual time to generic entry has remained
stable over the past decade despite increases in secondary patenring.24 In contrast, no suggestion that signatOries are permitted co constrain secondary patenting through robust generic challenge appears in the language of the leaked TPP
drafts. Thus, chere is arguably some tension in the US executive branch's domestic
and international positions.
A realist who assumes chat stares pursue only cheir immediate material interest (with more or .less success depending on their military and economic clout)2 5
would presumably find lit de reason for congruence between domestic and international positions. Even so, delving into the institutional dynamics rhac lead ro
divergent domestic and imernational positions highlights the agendas, and relative power, of different agencies.
Consider first the domestic context. A.lthough certain agencies and White
House offices may be quire supportive of strong domestic pacem righcs, they
compete for influence on questions of domestic patent policy with agencies typically more wary of parent rights. TI1e latter group includes che Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and
the Department of Health and Hw11an Services (HHS). 26 On the specific question of pharmaceutical pacem policy, DOJ Antitrust, FTC, and HHS have all
committed themselves quite publicly to facilitating domestic generic entry so as
co achieve low-cosc access for US parients.l'· A.lrhough the commitment of the

22. Brief for the Petitioner, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), available at http:/ /www.justicc.gov/atr/cascs/f29l700/29l720.pdf.
23. Arri Rai, Use Patent.>; Carve-Outs, and Incentives-A New Battle in the Drug Patent U1zrs,
367 N. ENGL.]. MF.D. 491 (20 12).
24. Scott C. HemphiU & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreming, Patent Cballenges, tmd ~ffective
lvfarketLifdnPbarmaceuticals, 31]. HEALTH EcoN. 327 (20 12).
25. Anne-Marie Slaughrer, InternationaL Relations, Principal 1heorie..-, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Wolfrum ed.. 20 I) ).
26. Rai, mpra norc 23.
27. See, e.g.. FED. TRADE COMM' N (FTC) & DEP'T Ol' JusncE (DOJ), 1'<1PROVfNG
HEALTH CARE: A DosE OF COMPETITlON (2004), ,w,til,lble ,u lmp://www.fi:c.gov/
rcports/healthcat·e/040723healthcarerpr.pdf.
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DO] Antitrust and the FTC is largely ideological, agencies such as HH$, as well
as powerful White House offices such as the Office of Management and Budget,
have a direct budgetary interest in costs incurred by public insurance programs.
By contrast, although an executive branch constituency for low-cost global
access does exist, irs strength is limited. Domestically oriented agencies obviously
do not have a strong financial stake in global access. To rhe extent they support
such a goal in principle, they are likely to manifest such support through laudable
but modest programs chat emphasize voluntary incentives for patent holders.
During the first Oban1a administration, for example, the USPTO established a
progran1 under which entities that demonstrate successful deployment of tech·
nology for humanitarian use can receive accelerated patent processing. 28
International humanitarian programs, such as the President's Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which provides antiretroviral (ARV) drugs
to 5.1 million of the 8 million individuals currently receiving ARVs in low· and
middle-income countries, do have a direct financial stake in low-cost global
access. Congress scrutinizes the activities of PEP FAR (and the Deparm1ent of
State office chat manages PEPFAR) to determine whether it is procuring ARV
drugs at a low per-patient cosr. 29 To fulfill this goal, PEPFAR relies heavily on
generic drug producers such as India. Indeed, according to a recent Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report, from 2005 to 2011, PEPFAR's reliance on
generic ARVs increased from 15 percent by volume to 98 percenr.30 This increase
saved PEPFAR approximately $934 million, allowing the program to expand
coverage rapidly and to include World Health Organization-recommended
products, such as fixed-dose combination products that do not have an equiva·
lem branded formulationY
Particularly in times of national economic stress, however, the power of these
constituencies is not comparable to that of economically oriented offices such as
the Office of rhe United States Trade Representative (USTR). Although USTR
is a small office with a budget of less than $100 million, its career staff is highly
skilled, it is committed to strong global IP rights, and it has dose connections

28. Quentin Palfrey & Hillary Chen. Rei/Jarding Inventors Wbo Work to Solve Global
Challenges, WH IT EHOuSE.Gov (Feb. 8, 2012 10:22 AM), http://www.whitchouse.gov/
blog/20 12/02/08/ rewarding·inventors·who·work·solvc· globaJ.challengcs (discussing rhe
launch of the Patents for Humanity program).

29. U.$. Gov'T

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-13·345, P RESIDENT'S EMERGENCY
PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF (20 13), av,zilable at hrcp:/ /www.gao.gov/producrs/ GAO·l3·345.

30./d.
31.ld.
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with US corporate leadership. The USTR rhus exercises significant influence
across changes in political leadership.
From a realist perspective, the ability of other countries to chaUenge the
United States is also limited. Although certain large emerging economies such
as India might invoke the manner in which US domestic law diverges from T PP
as rhetorical support for their own efforts to develop alternatives to TPP-type
regimes, 32 mere compelling rhecoric is unlikely to diminish US influence, particularly in the bilateral and plurilateral context.
Even perspectives that emphasize the role of multilateral institutions in
mediating longer-term, iterated baxgaining berween states might deem the US
approach a relatively stable equilibrium. On chis view, deviations between the
positions the United States is advocating internationally and domestically are
sufficiently narrow that they may fail to impress even international institutions
that have a "pro-access" agenda. Moreover, from the standpoint of delivering a
clear public message, both these institutions and civil society groups may prefer
to emphasize not narrow technical differences between US global and domestic
approaches but instead what they see as direct links between the strong patenting
and lack of access.
Going forward, rhe situation may change if the US healthcare spending
dilemma becomes sufficiently untenable that more dramatic moves are made with
respect to biopharmaceutical patents. But for the moment the United States is
likely co be able co manage any tensions in its global and domestic positions.
I turn next co the potentially disruptive role of China. Because China's development strategy has generally been ''pro-patent;' and because it has specifically
refrained from playing a leadership role in global controversies over access to
medicines, China's rise probably will not disrupt the equilibrium that the United
States has achieved on biopharmaceutical patents. Nonetheless, as discussed
below, China is likely to play a role in numerous domestic deliberations outside
the biopharmaceurical arena. On the global stage, China's relationship to the
American-led TPP negotiations will be an issue worth watching.

Ill. The Rise of China
For several reasons, China's rise is qualitatively different from what has come
before, at least since the rise of the Japanese economy in the 1970s and 1980s.
Most obviously, unlike other nations, China represents a serious threat to
US global economic dominance. Additionally, in conrrast to large emerging

32. Amy Kapczynski, H,zrmonization ,md Its Discontem~·: A Case Stud_y of TRIPS
Implemem,uion in Jnditl's Pbar-t~ltlCettric,zl Sector, 97 CAL. L. REv. 1571 (2009).
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economies such as India and Brazil. which have generally favored weaker patem protection, China has become substantially more aggressive than the United
States in encouraging its firms to seek parents.
That said, the Chinese approach coward patents has not been unilaterally
"pro-patent." To the contrary, in the context of standard setring and patents,
China has sometimes taken positions char could be seen as "anti-patent," perhaps
on the theory that standard setting represents a context where aggressive patent
assertions have che potential co create particularly acute "holdup" problems for
follow-on innovation. 33 Relacedly, China appears to view patents as an integral
piece of a broader innovation policy. Indeed, since 2006, China has been implementing a sweeping "innovation strategy" in which patents represent one lever.
By contrast, the US executive branch has historically resisted discussions ofinnovation policy, lese such discussions be seen as veering coo close roan endorsement
of industrial policy.
H ow the unique case ofChina's patent and innovation policy affects US positions domestically and internationally is a story that is only beginning to unfold.
After discussing China's patent and innovation policy, I offer some preliminary
choughcs.

IV. Ch ina's Patent and Innovation Policy
In 2011 , the Chinese State lntelleccual Property Office (SIPO) promulgated a
National Patent Development Strategy in which it set forth a goal of two million patent applications by 2015. Byway of comparison, the USPTO had 25 percent of that figure (540,000 applications) in 2012. To be sure, the two million
figure misses important distinctions between invention patents chat have been
examined for inventiveness and appropriate scope by an administrative agency
(so-called invention patents) and utility models available without examinatio n.
TI1e figure also fails to distinguish between domestic invention parents and invention patents filed by firms based in other countries.
However, even if we focus only on domestic invention patents, China's trajectory is notable. Since 2000, most of the growth in China's domestic patent applications has come from domestic invention patents.34 As a consequence, although
foreign and domestic inventors filed approximately similar numbers of invention
patents until 2005, by 2008 the domestic inventor percentage of applications

33. Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patmt Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1991
(2007).
34. Alben Hu & Gary Jefferson, A Gr~at Wall ofPatents: Wbat Is Bebind Cbina's Rtcent Patmt
ExplosJoll?, 90 J. DEv. EcoN. 57 (2009).
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.filed had increased tO 67.1 percent. Additionally, by 2008, che absolute number of
domestic invention patent grants was equal w foreign invention patent grants. By
2011, SIPO was ahead of the VSPTO with respect ro domestic invention patent
applications filings and grants in che respective offices. SIPO had 415,829 domestic invention patent applications, as compared with 247,750 for the USPTO, and
112,347 domestic invention grants, as compared with 108,626 for the USPT0. 35

Another traditional proxy for patents chat are likely tO have commercial value
is patents filed at WIPO via the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). China's numbers here are also rising rapidly. In 2011, China occupied the fourth spot, behind
che United States, Japan, and Germany.36
In part, these increasing numbers reflect a deliberate strategy by the Chinese
government to encourage patenting. According ro the US International Trade
Commission (USITC), provincial governments offer payments tO Chinese companies tO support the filing of patents in China and overseas. 37 Chinese companies may also qualify for tax relief, research awards, and government conn·acts
through patenting.38 In some cases, China is giving specific funds

tO

small and

medium-sized firms that file abroad. For exan1ple, in October 2009, the Chinese
Ministry of Finance announced a 100 million RMB fund to help small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), as well as public research insticmions, file abroad.39
That said, the firms most responsible for high levels of Chinese patenting
both domestically and abroad are large i nformation and communications technology (ICT) firms.40 Indeed, in 2011, two Chinese telecommunications firms,
ZTE Corp. and Huawei Technologies, had the largest and third-largest number
of PCT applications respectively. For these firms, the Chinese government may
be interested nor so much in innovation per seas in the need to assemble defensive patent portfolios in order to compete in the global ICT marketplace.

35. Peter Yu, Five Oft-Reptated Questions About China's Recem Rise as a Patent Power·, 2013
CARDOZO L. REv. DE Novo 78 (2013).
36. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. 0RC. (WIPO), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INDICATORS 63 (2012), available at hrrp:/ /www.wipo.inr/exporr/sites/www/freepublicarions/cn/intproperty/941/wipo_pub _941_20 12.pdf.
37. U.S. lNT'L TRADE COMM'N (USITC), Pub. No. 4199, China: IP lnfringemenr, Indigenous
Innovarion Policies and Framework for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Economy (20 10),
available at hnp:/ /www.usitc.gov/publicarions/332/pub4199.pdf.

38./d.
39. Tu Lei, Ministry ofFinance to Support Overseas Patent:;, ALIBAllA.COM (Ocr. 13, 2009, 8:02
AM), hrtp: // news.alibaba.com/ arricle/demil/business-in-china/1 00 182805-1-mof-supportoverscas-patenrs.html.
40. Markus Eberhardt, Christian Helmers & Zhihong Yu, lr the Dmgon Leaming to F~y!' .-in
Analysis ofthe Chinese Patmt Explosion, (Univ. of Oxford Crr. for rhe Srudy of African Econs.
Working Paper Series, No. 2011-15, 20 l 1).
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The Chinese government has not, however, been uniformly "pro-patent."
To the contrary, in 2009, the government proposed regulations that would have
required patented technology relevant to national standards to be subject to
compulsory licensing either royalty-free or at below-market rates.41 Although
the government then acceded tO commentary by foreign firms strongly opposing
these proposed regulations, it still manages standard setting centrally. 42
China's patent strategy is just one part of an overall fifteen-year innovation
strategy. The strategy, summarized in a 2006 document entitled the "N ational
Medium and Long Term Plan for Science and Technology Development," not
only specifies domestic invention patent goals (further refined in the 2011
patent plan noted earlier) but more broadly calls for China to become an
"innovation-oriented society" by 2020. 43 The approach suggested by the plan
includes: an emphasis on "zuzhu chuangxin"-a somewhat ambiguous concept
often translated as "indigenous innovarion;' 44 prioritizing certain areas offwncier
technology, the development of an "integrated national system of institutions
supportive of R&D", increased funding for R&D, and assimilation of foreign
technology.

V. The US Reaction
Thus far, the US executive branch has reacted most strongly, at least at the rhetorical level, to the Chinese "indigenous innovation" strategy. It has particularly
objected to the government procurement preferences for Chinese firms, which
form part of the strategy. These objections may form part of the basis for US
resistance to Chinese participation in the TPP negotiations.
The executive branch's reaction to the notable growth in Chinese patent applications and patents has emphasized quality problems, particularly in utility applications that are not examined. For example, even the White House Office of the
lmeUecrual Property Enforcement Coordinator, which traditionally advocates
for strong intellectual property protection internationally, has publicly expressed
concern about the quality of "unexamined utility model patencs."45 Presumably
41. USITC, supra note 37.
42. !d. U.S. 11n'L TRADE CoMM'N (USITC), China: Etfccrs of IP Infringcmcnr and
Indigenous Innovation Policies on rhc U.S. Economy (2011) available at http:/ / www.usirc.
gov I publicarions/332/pub4226.pdf.
43. Cong Cao, Richard P. Surtmcier & Denis F. Simon, China's 15-Ytar Science and Technology
Plan, S9 PHYSICS TODAY 38-43 (2006).
44. Yu, supra note 3S.
4S. Mark MacCarthy. Cbina's Utility Modtl Systtm: A Ptrftct Stormfor Pattnl Trolls, DIGITAL
DISCOURSE (Sept. 20,20 12), http:/ /www.siia.ner/bloglindex.php/20 12/09/chinas-uriliry-m
odcl-patent-sysrcm•a·perfect-srorm-for-patent-rrolls (last visited Sepr. S, 2013).
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these concerns are also being expressed in private bilateral meetings, and will
become more acute as China's patent litigation docket continues co increase significantly and we see more cases of Chinese firms using patents arguably of dubious quality ro sue US firms.
Agreemenc across the executive branch about poor Chinese patent quality
could bolster efforts to improve patent quality domestically. Alcernacively, the
executive branch might feel compelled to compere with China on patent applications and grants. The domestic effect in the United States of Chinese efforts
in the areas of standard setting and innovation policy could also be significant.
In standard setting, the executive branch has, since 1998, had a formal policy of
deferring to private sector efforts. Specifically, Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular A-119, entitled "Federal Participation in the Development
and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment
Activities:· directs agencies char need to adopt standards generally ro defer to
decisions made by private sector standard-setting bodies.46 This deferential policy
has, however, been criticized for being outdated, particularly in light of increasing
concerns about holdup when private standard-setting bodies have unclear policies on patents. Even so, the executive branch has not an1ended Circular A-119.
A recent statement by OMB, USTR, and the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) does indicate that, in certain areas of"national
priority:' such as health information technology and promoting clean energy,
federal agencies might be more proactive with respect to standards.47 Overall,
however, the document reaffirms a commitmem co private-seccor leadership in
the area. A desire on the part of certain executive branch offices (and like-minded
congressional leaders) to present a strong counter-exan1ple co China may constrain domestic action on standards. Similarly, rhe need to draw a stark contrast
with China may represent at least a rhetorical obstacle co the adoption of highly
proactive executive branch innovation policies.
Ultimately, concerns about drawing contrasts with China are probably less
important than purely domestic factors such as pro-market ideology, political
gridlock, or dran1atic fiscal constraints. Even so, of any country that could affect
US patent and innovation policy in the domestic context, China is the likeliest
candidate.

46. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDG ET, ExEC. O FFICE OF THE PRESIDEN T, OMB CIRC ULAR
No. A-119, fEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN T HE DEVEI.OP.M ENT AN D USE O F VOLUNT ARY
CONSENS US STANDARDS AND IN CONI'ORMIT Y ASSESS~!ENT AC TIVITIES,

63 Fed. Reg.

8546 (Feb. 19, 1998), available 11t hrrp: / / www.whirehousc.gov/omb/ ckculars_all 9 _all9fr.

47. MF.MORAND U.M FROM T H E O FFlC£ O F M GMT. & BuDG ET, U.S. TRADE REP. & 0HIC F.
(Jan.17, 2012), at1ailable at hrrp: //www.whirchouse.gov/ sires/
defaulr/ files/omb/memoranda/ 20 12/ m-12-0S.pdf.
Of SciENCE & TECH. PoL'Y
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On the global patent stage, one key question tO watch will be China's relationship to the TPP negotiations. With respect to the possibility of Chinese entry,
US executive branch views will be influenced in part by wariness regarding rhe
impact of Chinese patent and innovation policy on the interests of US firms. By
the same token, any aggressive move by the United States to exclude China may
have unintended consequences in terms of causing China tO more aggressively
pursue patent and innovation strategies that explicidy favor Chinese firms.

